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Abstract  
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between market structure and energy prices 
in the Hungarian balancing energy market. In Hungary, 
balancing energy is procured in two phases: firstly a 
reserve capacity auction is organized to select the 
generation capacities that are kept in reserve and 
available to the TSO in a specific day, and then a 
balancing energy auction is used to determine the dispatch 
order of reserved capacities in the hours of that day. 
Under this arrangement the winners of the reserve 
auctions and thereby the bidders in the balancing energy 
auctions change significantly form one day to the next. I 
exploit this variation in the bidding environment in the 
balancing energy auctions to identify the effect of market 
structure on prices. My empirical analysis focuses on the 
downward balancing market where generators submit bids 
for purchasing energy from the TSO. Consistently with the 
theoretical results in Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord 
[1], I find that the average purchasing price is positively 
affected by the number of bidders and the symmetry in 
capacity share distribution.  
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1 Introduction 
Wholesale electricity markets have a number of 
characteristics that make them susceptible to the exercise 
of market power (e.g., transmission constraints, high entry 
barriers, price-inelastic demand, etc.). The markets for 
reserve capacity and balancing energy are even more 
susceptible to market power problems due to restrictions 
on foreign suppliers’ participation. This paper investigates 
market power in the Hungarian decremental balancing 
energy market, motivated by the following observations. 
First, the auction market for decremental balancing 
energy in Hungary is characterized by high concentration. 
The average number of bidders in the daily auctions was 
2.3 in 2012. Second, the hourly average price of all 
submitted decremental balancing energy bids was on 
average 5.7 EUR/MWh in 2012. Considering that 
downward balancing is almost exclusively provided from 
gas fired generators in Hungary, this observation suggests 
that Hungarian generators offer decremental energy with 
substantial markdowns from marginal cost. 
In the literature several modeling approaches have 
been used to predict the performance of electricity 
markets. One such approach is the supply function 
equilibrium model, originally developed by Klemperer 
and Meyer [2]. They show that when firms face uncertain 
demand they prefer to set supply function rather than 
compete in quantities or prices. The supply function 
equilibrium model has been extensively used in the 
empirical literature for analyzing electricity markets. 
Many studies including Rudkevich, Duckworth, and 
Rosen [3] and Baldick, Grant, and Kahn [4] compare 
estimates of market power with that predicted by the 
theory using marginal cost estimates, while others, 
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including Wolak [5] and Bosco, Parisio, and Pelagatti [6], 
retrieve marginal cost functions and price-cost margins 
from bid data assuming optimal bidding.   
The other major modeling approach in the analysis of 
electricity markets is the multi-unit auction theory. This 
approach was first applied by von der Fehr and Harbord 
[7] and subsequently developed further by Anwar [8], 
Crespo [9] and Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord  [1]. 
This approach assumes that generators submit step-
function bids to a multi-unit auction. It is argued that the 
discrete bid space better reflects the institutional reality of 
electricity markets. Indeed, in real electricity auctions it is 
common to place a restriction on the number of bids a 
bidder can make. Several studies have used the multi-unit 
auction model to empirically analyze the generators’ 
bidding behavior in the England and Wales wholesale 
electricity market. For example, Wolfram [10] shows that 
larger suppliers bids more than smaller suppliers for 
similar units and also that suppliers bid larger markups for 
units being higher up in the merit order. Crawford, 
Crespo, and Tauchen [11] find evidence for asymmetric 
bidding behavior between the price-setter and the non-
price setters which corresponds to the prediction of the 
(uniform pricing) multi-unit auction model with capacity 
constrained bidders.  
While day-ahead electricity markets have attracted a 
large body of empirical research, much less attention has 
been paid to the reserve capacity and balancing energy 
markets. An exception is the balancing energy market of 
the Texas electricity market, which has been examined by 
a number of researchers. Niu [12] compares the observed 
balancing energy prices to that emerging from the supply 
function equilibrium model. The equilibrium prices are 
calculated in a linear function supply model using 
estimated cost data. The results of the analysis show that 
the price data fit the theoretical model quite well for the 
upward balancing market, but there is a large discrepancy 
for the downward balancing market. The analysis by 
Sioshani and Oran [13] is also based on the comparison of 
the actual supply curves and the optimal bidding curves in 
the Texas balancing energy market. Their results show 
that the supply function model produces a good prediction 
of bidding behavior of power plants only in the case of 
the largest generators. Heim and Götz [14] examines 
whether the drastic price increase in the German power 
reserve market has been solely driven by increased costs. 
The authors provide statistical evidence that market price 
has been manipulated by the two largest generators. The 
authors suggest that the pivotal position of the power 
plants and the pay-as-bid pricing rule applied in the 
German market have been the main reasons for this 
output. 
2 Market design for the Hungarian 
balancing energy market  
The balancing energy market is a market where the 
TSO can buy or sell energy (the so-called balancing 
energy) at short notice. The balancing energy is used to 
cover the differences between electricity generation and 
consumption after the closing of the intraday electricity 
market. This paper focuses on the market for secondary 
balancing energy.
1
  
In Hungary, the procurement of balancing energy 
consists of two phases: the “capacity-selection” phase and 
the “capacity-ordering” phase. In the first phase, the TSO 
selects the power plants that are held in reserve to be 
available for real-time balancing. This is performed 
through the so called reserve capacity auctions. In 
Hungary, reserve capacity auctions are held once a year 
and upward and downward regulation reserves are 
procured as separate services. In the reserve auction, the 
TSO runs separate sections for each day of the following 
year and selects the winners in each section on the basis 
of the capacity fee bids. The TSO awards market maker 
contracts to the successful bidders. The contract specifies 
the days of the year on which the service is to be provided 
and amount of reserve to be delivered for each contracted 
day. It also specifies the capacity fees to be paid to the 
provider for each delivery day. The capacity remuneration 
is based on the accepted bids. The capacity fee can be 
seen as an option price paid by the TSO to the generator 
for keeping the capacity available and not being used in 
other ways. However, the price at which the generator is 
prepared to buy or sell excess energy from/to the TSO 
(i.e. the “strike price” of the option) is only determined in 
the second phase of the procurement process: in the 
balancing energy auction.
2
 The balancing energy auction 
is held daily with 24 time segments each of one hour. 
Bidders in the balancing energy auction can be grouped 
into two categories: contracted parties and non-contracted 
parties. On a given day the contracted parties are those 
who previously won market maker contract for that day. 
They are obliged to make energy price bids up to the 
contracted capacity at each hour of the day. The energy 
price bid cannot be lower than the minimum bidding price 
                                                          
1 Tertiary control power is rarely used in Hungary. 
2 However, the contract specifies a minimum bidding price 
(maximum bidding price) in case of the decremental 
(incremental) energy.  
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determined in the contract. In addition to contracted 
suppliers all technically qualified suppliers can bid into 
the balancing energy auction at short notice. They get 
remunerated if called. However they do not receive any 
capacity fee.  The energy price bids are used by the TSO 
to determine the dispatch order of generators in each hour 
of the following day. The reserve capacities are called 
upon according to their energy price bids when 
imbalances occur. The remuneration is based on the pay-
as-bid settlement rule. 
3 Theoretical framework 
I draw on the discriminatory multi-unit auction model 
in Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord [1] to inform the 
empirical analysis. The authors of this paper analyze a 
game-theoretic model in which two single-unit firms with 
asymmetric capacities and costs compete to supply the 
market. They assume that each firm has a single unit with 
constant marginal cost up to capacity. Firms must submit 
a single price offer for their entire capacity, which may 
not be higher than the reserve price set by the auctioneer. 
Further, it is assumed that firms face a market demand 
that is perfectly inelastic. They derive the equilibrium 
strategies in this game for different demand realizations. 
They show that under a certain threshold the game has a 
unique Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies, while above 
this threshold it has a unique Nash-equilibrium in mixed 
strategies. They also provide comparative static results 
which show how bidding strategies change with changes 
in the model parameters. In particular, they demonstrate 
that in high-demand realizations price competition is 
more intense when there are more bidders, capacities are 
more symmetrically distributed, and the reserve price is 
lower.  
There are a number of reasons why the theoretical 
model described in [1] is thought to be an appropriate 
framework for analyzing the Hungarian balancing market. 
First, the auction mechanism adopted in the Hungarian 
balancing market is similar to the one considered in [1]. 
Most importantly, it is a distinguishing feature of the 
Hungarian balancing energy auction that firms must 
submit a single price offer for their entire reserve 
capacity.  Similarly to the auction model in [1], the price 
bid is constrained by a reserve price preset in the contract. 
Second, the market structure modeled in [1] is very 
representative of the Hungarian balancing energy market. 
As said before, the auction market for downward 
balancing is characterized by high market concentration. 
In fact, in 2012, there were 160 days on which only two 
single-unit generators were bidding for decremental 
energy. 
Although Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord [1] obtain 
their results for a reverse auction, one can easily derive 
similar results for an ordinary auction. In doing so, I 
formulated the following hypotheses: 
1. The number of bidders has a positive impact on the 
average decremental energy price (calculated as a 
simple average of all submitted hourly price bids). 
2. A more equal distribution of capacities among 
bidders has a positive impact on the average 
decremental energy price. 
3. An increase in capacity asymmetry initially increases 
and the decreases the price dispersion (measured by 
the difference between the highest and lowest price 
bids).  
4 Market characteristics 
 
Power generation sector of Hungary 
 Total electricity consumption in Hungary reached 40 
TWh, in 2012. Nuclear produced 46% of domestic 
generation while natural gas provided 28%, coal 20% and 
renewables 6%. Two-thirds of power generation came 
from two large base-load plants: Paks (nuclear-based) and 
Matra (lignite-based). Hungary has 10 GW of installed 
generation capacity, which exceeds the country’s peak 
load measured in 2012 (6.5 GW) by about 50 percent. 
Hungary’s electricity system is interconnected with all but 
one of its neighbors with a large capacity compared to the 
size of the market. In 2012, net import totaled 8 TWh, or 
20 percent of total electricity supply. 
 
Market for decremental balancing energy 
In 2012, a total of nine power plants participated in the 
down-regulation market in Hungary. All but one power 
plants providing balancing power were natural gas-based. 
There are two main factors that explain the dominance of 
natural gas plants in the balancing power market. Firstly, 
Hungary has no hydroelectric power plants. Second, the 
nuclear and lignite base-load plants (Paks and Matra) do 
not participate in the balancing power market. 
In most European countries gas-fired generators have 
been struggling with poor economic conditions since 
2011. Due to a combination of low electricity and high 
natural gas prices producer margins have fallen 
drastically. In early 2012 the average spark spread 
dropped below zero in many European electricity 
markets. Given the importance of gas-fired generators in 
providing balancing power in Hungary, next we review 
the relationship between the competitiveness of gas-fired 
plants and their incentives to provide balancing power.  
Down-regulating reserves are spinning reserves 
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because generation can be reduced only at units that are 
already producing energy. Therefore, the cost of reserve 
capacity depends on the spread between wholesale price 
and variable cost. If the marginal generation cost of a 
power plant is below the electricity price at the wholesale 
market, then the supplier would run the plant at full 
capacity. Hence, in such periods the cost of providing 
negative reserve for real-time balancing is zero. If the 
marginal generation cost of a power plant exceeds the 
electricity price at the wholesale market than the cost of 
keeping negative reserve at the plant equals the loss the 
supplier incurs from generating and selling electricity. To 
provide negative control power, the production level of 
the plant must exceed its minimal technical load by the 
amount of reserve power delivered. The higher is the 
difference between the marginal cost of the plant and the 
wholesale electricity price, the higher is the price that the 
supplier will charge for keeping reserve power.
3
  
From the above discussion it follows that there is an 
inverse relationship between the electricity price at the 
wholesale market and the availability and price of 
negative reserve power. At times when wholesale prices 
are low and fewer generating units are scheduled to 
operate, it costs more for the TSO to procure the 
necessary amount of reserve.   
Over 2012, the average spot price for base-load power 
was 51.5 EUR/MWh and the spot price for peak-load was 
61.3 EUR/MWh in the Hungarian Power Exchange 
(HUPX). Under realistic efficiency parameters and 2012 
natural gas prices, an average CCGT plants had variable 
cost of around 80-90 EUR/MWh. These figures suggest 
that power companies run their gas-fired plants only in 
hours in which they were contracted to provide reserve 
power to the TSO and could recover their loss in their 
capacity fee. This also implies that in the daily balancing 
energy auctions the TSO only received bids from the 
contracted parties, since other providers did not operate 
their gas-fired units due to weak market conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 This illustration assumes that the marginal cost of 
production is constant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Distribution of the numbers of bidders in the daily balancing 
energy auctions (2012) 
Figure 2 shows the seasonal pattern of supply of and 
demand for decremental energy. As seen, the expected 
amount of negative balancing energy tends to be higher in 
the heating season. It is also seen that the TSO attempts to 
maintain the supply-demand balance and reserve more 
down-regulating capacity in the winter months. As a 
result, there is no clear seasonal pattern in the supply-
demand balance. The expected demand balance seems to 
be constant throughout the year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Supply-demand balance in the decremental energy market 
(2012) 
 
5 Empirical analysis  
My aim is to assess the effect of market structure on 
prices in the auction market for downward balancing 
energy. Since the winning bidders of the reserve capacity 
auctions are released on the TSO’s webpage, I have 
accurate data for those bidders in the daily balancing 
energy auctions who were contractually obliged to 
participate, i.e. market makers.
4
 These data allow me to 
                                                          
4 Although the data about the winning bids are released in an 
anonymized form on the TSO’s webpage, the identity of the 
bidders can be easily revealed on the basis of the load gradients 
(i.e. the rate of change of nominal output in a given timeframe) 
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characterize the market structure of the balancing energy 
auctions, if it is assumed that other suppliers than market 
makers made no bids. Unfortunately, with respect to the 
outcome of the balancing energy auctions, only the simple 
average of all submitted energy price bids, as well as the 
maximum and minimum energy price bids are published. 
These dataset does not allow for an assessment of 
individual bidding strategies. However, using the large 
variation in the identity, number and capacity share 
distribution of bidders across auctions held on different 
days I can analyze the impact of market structure on price 
levels and dispersion. 
 
6 Empirical investigation and results  
To test Hypotheses 1-2, I estimate the following 
regression model: 
 
asym
t t t t t tB HHI D X Y           ,        (1)       (1) 
where 
6
1 1
1 1
 
6
tn
t thi
h it
B b
n 
   is the average bid over all 
bidders and over all hours between 0AM and 6AM in day 
t, 
asymHHI is a measure of capacity asymmetry, tD  is a 
set of dummies each representing the same group of 
bidders, tX  is a vector of general control variables (e.g. 
spot gas price), and tY is a vector of control variables 
applying to CHP plants only (e.g. the outside 
temperature). 
The reason why I use the daily averages of hourly bids 
is that the market structure variables vary only across 
days.  
My data cover only the bids from the contracted 
parties (market makers). As argued before, we have a 
good reason to believe that other firms than contracted 
parties did not submit bids into the balancing energy 
market in most of the hours of the year. This was assumed 
on the basis that the low electricity prices on the 
wholesale market in 2012 made gas-fired generation 
unprofitable. (Therefore gas-fired power plants were 
online only in those days when they had a contract with 
the TSO to provide balancing power and could recover 
their loss in the capacity payment.) This assumption 
surely holds for the off-peak hours when prices are the 
lowest. Hence, only the bids submitted during the hours 
0-6 AM are used for the empirical analysis. 
The bidder group dummies indicate if the same group 
of generators participates in the auction. They are used to 
remove the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
                                                                                              
that were also published next to the accepted bids in 2012. 
between power generators (such as difference in 
production costs).     
Following Lijesen and van de Vort [15], I define a 
measure of capacity share inequality based on the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI can be 
decomposed into two components: 
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where 
NHHI and  
asymHHI  measure, respectively, 
the effects of the number of suppliers and market share 
inequality on market concentration. Since the former 
effect is captured by the bidding group dummies, I 
included only 
asymHHI  in Eq. (1).  
Table 1 reports the results of the estimation of Eq. (1). 
There are four columns of results: in the first two, the 
OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) method is used, while in 
the last two, the WLS (Weighted Least Squares) method 
is applied.  
The key variables of interest are the 
asymHHI and the 
group dummies. The coefficient of the 
asymHHI is 
statistically significant and of negative value in all models 
presented in Table 1. These results confirm the theoretical 
finding that an increase in the asymmetry in capacity 
shares leads to lower prices. The estimates of coefficients 
on the group dummies indicate that increasing the number 
of bidders from two to three leads to stronger competition 
(higher bids). However, competition among four bidders 
on average resulted in lower prices (weaker competition) 
than competition between three bidders. I suspect that this 
unexpected result has to do with the behavior of CHP 
plants. Other studies reported that CHP plants tend to 
underprice their decremental offers because they have 
strong disincentives to adjust their output [12]. Since the 
cases when one or more CHP plants participated in the 
balancing market overlap with the cases when four 
bidders took part in the auction, the relatively low price 
associated with the auctions with four bidders are likely to 
be explained by the presence of CHP plants among the 
bidders. 
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Table 1: Estimates for average decremental energy 
price (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: the daily average of decremental 
energy price bids (HUF/kWh); 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses for 
OLS models; 
number of bidders is used as weights for WLS models; 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
 
The TTF stands for the spot price of natural gas. As 
expected, the coefficient of this variable has a positive 
sign. (The higher the cost of natural gas, the more can be 
gained from reducing output.) 
To test Hypotheses 3, I estimate the following 
regression model: 
 
  (3)         (3) 
 
 
where 
6
max
1 2
1
1
( ; ;...; )
6 t
t th th thn
h
B Max b b b

   is the 
hourly average maximum bid in hours 1-6 in day t,  
6
min
1 2
1
1
( ; ;...; )
6 t
t th th thn
h
B Min b b b

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is the hourly 
average minimum bid in hours 1-6 in day t.  This 
specification follows from the hypothesis that the impact 
of capacity asymmetry may be non-monotonic. I add 
asym
tHHI  squared to equation (3) to account for this 
possibility.  
Table 2 reports the results of the estimation of Eq. (3). 
 
Table 2: Estimates for price dispersion in the 
decremental energy market (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: the difference between the 
maximum and minimum decremental energy price bids 
(HUF/kWh); 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses for 
OLS models; 
number of bidders is used as weights for WLS models; 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
 
The empirical results are consistent with the 
theoretical predication. The parameter values of 1 and 
2 imply that price dispersion is increasing at 
asymHHI
levels below 0.17 and decreasing at 
asymHHI levels of 
0.17 and higher.  
7 Conclusion 
This paper assesses the effect of market structure on 
prices in the auction market for downward balancing 
energy in Hungary. It shows that fewer bidders, less equal 
distribution of reserved capacities among bidders, and the 
presence of CHP plants lead to less competitive pricing. 
These results suggests that in an environment in which the 
TSO can only rely on the contracted parties to provide 
daily balancing services it should pay more attention to 
max min
1
2
( )
   
asym
t t t
asym asym
t t t t t t
B B HHI
HHI HHI D X Y
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    
   
    
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the sufficiency of the number of reserve providers and 
their market shares in the contracting phase (i.e. in the 
reserve capacity auction).  
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